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Namibia, South Africa, and the
Walvis Bay Dispute
Walvis Bay is a port situated on the coast of the emerging nation of
Namibia.' The Republic of South Africa currently occupies and con-
trols both Namibia and Walvis Bay.2 Namibia will soon be an inde-
pendent nation free from South African control; the Pretoria govern-
ment, however, alleges that the colonial title it inherited from the
United Kingdom gives it sovereignty over the Bay,3 despite the com-
mon history, culture, and economic and political systems shared by the
Bay and Namibia. This Note argues that the South African claims are
invalid and that, legally, the Bay belongs to and therefore must remain
with Namibia.
The South African legal claim is based on carefully selected his-
torical facts and legal theories. South Africa omits certain colonial his-
torical facts that undermine its claim, and it overlooks contemporary
international law that requires precolonial history to be considered in
decolonization disputes. This Note will show that South Africa has
relinquished its title to the Bay under three theories of current inter-
national law: 1) the norms of international estoppel bar South Africa
from separating Walvis Bay and Namibia; 2) the boundaries of non-
self-governing territories granted independence may be determined on
1. This Note will use "Walvis Bay" or "the Bay" to refer to the harbor, city, and
surrounding enclave as claimed by the British in 1878. See I. BROWNLIE, AFRICAN
BOUNDARIES 1273-88 (1979) (describing area claimed by British). This Note will use the
name "Namibia" to refer to the geographic area designated on many maps by the colonial
appellation "South West Africa." The name Namibia is now used by the indigenous
groups in the territory and has been recognized by the United Nations as the official
name of the territory. G.A. Res. 2372, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16A) 1, U.N. Doc. A/
6176/Add.1 (1968).
2. See J. DUGARD, THE SouTH WEsT AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE 18 (1973).
The legal status of Walvis Bay is a recent subject of debate in the international com-
munity. This Note represents the first published attempt to present a complete analysis
of the factual and legal issues involved in that debate. There are a number of islands off
the coast of Namibia that also have been subjected to South African administration since
colonial times. While some of the arguments presented in this Note may thus be ap-
plicable to them, this Note will address exclusively the status of Walvis Bay.
3. See id. at 17.
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the basis of precolonial sovereignty; and 3) South Africa has violated
the duties imposed on it by the United Nations Charter and thus has
forfeited its authority over Walvis Bay.
I. The Use of International Estoppel Against South Africa
The traditional legal norm of estoppel prevents South Africa from
severing Walvis Bay from Namibia. Before estoppel can be invoked
against a party, three elements must exist: a party, aware of a right that
could be enforced, must choose not to assert it or must assert it in-
effectively; a party must know that its nonassertion or ineffective asser-
tion may be interpreted as an abandonment of the right; and a party
must induce other parties to rely on the nonassertion or ineffective as-
sertion of the right sufficiently so that belated enforcement would prej-
udice or harm them.4
A. The Facts of Unification
Historical as well as contemporary facts establish that all the elements
of estoppel are present in the case of Walvis Bay. In 1884, South Africa
held an enforceable right to incorporate Walvis Bay into itself and,
by its own rendition of the facts, was aware of this right at that time.
It failed, however, to assert this right. Instead, it took steps to in-
corporate the Bay with the territory that now comprises Namibia, steps
that caused the inhabitants of both to develop a complete interdepen-
dence. These subsequent actions of incorporating the Bay with Namibia
rather than itself undermine South Africa's original right to the Bay.
4. See W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 385-86 (1971) (describing elements of in-
ternational estoppel).
5. South Africa's rendition of the facts is as follows: On March 12, 1878, the Com-
mander of the British ship Industry took possession of the Bay in Her Majesty's name.
On December 14, the British annexed the Bay to the Cape of Good Hope Colony. Five
years later, on August 7, 1884, the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope confirmed this
action by annexing the Bay to the Colony. By the South Africa Constitution Act of 1909,
which created the Union of South Africa, the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope along with
the Bay became parts of the Union of South Africa. When the Union of South Africa
became the Republic of South Africa, South Africa contends, Walvis Bay was still a part
of the Cape Province. See Dept. of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, The Legal
Status of Walvis Bay, at E3-E4 (Sept. 1977) (unpublished memorandum) (on file with
Yale Law Journal). The fact of formal annexation, on which South Africa relies, is
merely indicative of its awareness of its right to incorporate the Bay. Formal incorpora-
tion, however, never took place. See pp. 907-08 infra. Basic positivist arguments, similar to
those of the government, are put forward in other works by South Africans. See, e.g., D.
PIUNSLOO, WALViS BAY AND THE PENGUIN ISLANDS (1977); Note, The Legal Status of Walvis
Bay, 2 S. Ara. Y.B. INT'L L. 187 (1976).
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The statements and actions of South Africa establish a pattern of
conduct directed towards the total unification of Walvis Bay and
Namibia. Although South Africa has controlled Walvis Bay since
1884, it had no power over hinterland Namibia until Germany lost
its sovereignty over the area after World War I. South Africa was
then given German South West Africa-now Namibia-as a class "C"
mandate, which permitted it to administer the territory as though it
were an integral part of itself.7 Shortly after South Africa acquired
the mandate in 1922, it announced that Walvis Bay would be ad-
ministered from Windhoek, the Namibian capital, as though the Bay
and its inhabitants were part of the mandated territory." Later that year
South Africa reported, to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the
League of Nations, on Walvis Bay as an integrated part of the mandated
territory. When asked about the integration, its representative stated
that the Bay had been attached to the mandated territory for ad-
ministrative reasons.9
In 1928, South Africa again indicated that Namibia and Walvis Bay
were united. The South African representative to the Permanent
Mandates Commission declared that "Walvis Bay . .. was essential to
the economic development of the mandated territory" and that "the
trade of South West Africa would be severely injured were it not to
control Walvis Bay."' 01 In addition, he asserted that "the fact of the
incorporation of Walvis Bay in South West Africa"" permitted the
South West Africa Administrator to make representations on behalf
of Walvis Bay to the Union Minister. By 1929, the Permanent Mandates
Commission was persuaded by such statements that Walvis Bay was
an integral part of South West Africa.' 2 Thus, by its own statements
South Africa endorsed the unification of the economic, political, and
social structures of Walvis Bay and Namibia. These public endorse-
6. Germany gained control over hinterland Namibia in 1884. See, e.g., E. RITCHIE, THE
UNFINISHED WAR 87 (1940) (describing Germany's colonization of South West Africa). It lost
control after its defeat in W.W.I. See Treaty of Versailles, June 29, 1919, art. 119
(Germany relinquishes all overseas possessions).
7. See M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKwARD TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 252-54 (1926) (reprinting mandate for German South West Africa).
8. See South West Africa Affairs Act No. 24 of 1922, LAWS OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA 1915-
1922, at 20 (1923).
9. See Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 6A LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
(3d Sess.) 103 (1923).
10. Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 6A LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
(14th Sess.) 69 (1928) (remarks of South African representative).
11. Id.
12. Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 6A LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
(15th Sess.) 294 (1929) (requesting more information on lack of South African voting
privileges in Walvis Bay).
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ments led the residents of Namibia and Walvis Bay to expect that the
unification would be permanent.
In addition to its public statements on the incorporation of Walvis
Bay into Namibia, South Africa took action to unify the two. After the
1922 proclamation merging Walvis Bay with Namibia, South Africa
enacted laws that developed a South West African constitution 13 and
drew electoral boundaries.' 4 These laws included Walvis Bay in the
mandated territory, and thus Walvis Bay residents have always voted
in Namibian elections. The residents of Walvis Bay have never been
granted South African voting privileges. 15 The unification resulting
from these laws was so complete that by 1928 the administration of
Walvis Bay was entirely in the hands of the Administrator of South
West Africa.'0
This integration of Namibia and Walvis Bay has promoted a signif-
icant and continuing dependence between the two. The Bay relies on
Namibia for the seasonal labor force for its fishing industry)' Hinter-
land Namibia is dependent on the Bay as its only deep water port18
and as a crucial factor in the maintenance of its international trade,
Similarly, the Bay is demographically integrated with Namibia; many
of the Bay residents were born elsewhere in Namibia and will be
Namibian citizens regardless of the status of the Bay.20 Furthermore,
because the laws of South West Africa have been applied in Walvis
Bay, the political and bureaucratic organizations in the Bay look to the
13. See J. DuGARD, supra note 2, at 83 (discussing South West Africa Constitution Act
No. 42 of 1925).
14. See Government Notice No. 41 of 1926, LAws OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA 1923-1927, at
364 (1928).
15. See notes 11 & 12 supra; J. SERFONTEIN, NAMIBIA? 422-23 (1976) (Walvis Bay part of
Namibian Omaruru constituency).
16. See Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 6A LEAGUE oF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
(14th Sess.) 68 (1928) (remarks of South African representative) (example of unified ad-
ministration is that population of Walvis Bay is included in population statistics of
Namibia).
17. See Windhoek Advertiser, Sept. 7, 1977 (six thousand migrant laborers from
northern Namibia brought to Walvis Bay under one year contracts to provide labor for
fishing industry) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
18. See p. 921 infra.
19. See pp. 920-21 infra (discussing lack of transportation alternatives).
20. See J. SERFONTEIN, supra note 15, at 422 (estimating that over 90% of residents of
Narraville, unincorporated "Coloured" suburb of Walvis Bay, were born in other parts of
Namibia). Residents who are Namibian citizens feel as much a part of Walvis Bay as
anyone born in the Bay and vice versa. See, e.g., Transcript of Conference on Southern
Africa sponsored by the New York Bar Association and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights under Law, Session VII, Nov. 9, 1978, at 6-7 (statement by native Namibian that
he grew up knowing no difference between Walvis Bay and Namibia) (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
906
Vol. 89: 903, 1980
Walvis Bay
Namibian capital of Windhoek for administration rather than to the
South African capital of Pretoria.2 1
B. The Reasons for Unification
Although it may seem illogical that South Africa would relinquish
its rights over the Bay by unifying it with the mandated territory, its
actions are easily understood in light of its goal of regional dominance
and its attitude toward the mandate system. If South Africa had not
been interested in Namibia, it would never have annexed Walvis
Bay.
As early as 1876, the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope22 was in-
terested in possessing all of Namibia-Bay and hinterland-in order to
monopolize southern African interior trade.23 Great Britain formally
annexed Walvis Bay at the Cape's instigation.24 Had Germany not
annexed the hinterland, Britain would have maintained informal con-
trol over the rest of Namibia as well.25 After the loss of the hinter-
land,26 the Cape Colonists expended little energy to develop or in-
21. Despite its professed intention to bring Walvis Bay under South African administra-
tion, South Africa has not yet carried out its threat. Compare Windhoek Advertiser, Apr.
26, 1976 (Prime Minister Vorster announces South African intentions to administer Walvis
Bay from Pretoria) (on file with Yale Law Journal) with Johannesburg Star, Sept. 3, 1977
(at time of official change, only Dep't of Posts and Telecommunications switched to South
African administration) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
22. Prior to 1909, present day South Africa was a number of separate colonies: Orange,
Transvaal, Natal, and Cape of Good Hope. See A. VANDENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
WVORLD 3-8 (1970). The Cape of Good Hope, or the Cape Colony, is the colony with the
longest history of interest in Namibia.
23. The Cape sent an explorer, William Coates Palgrave, to ascertain the possibility
of British rule over the entire area. See IV. PALGRAVE, REPORT OF W. COATES PALGRAvE
EsQ., SPECIAL COMMISSIONER TO THE TRIBES NORTH OF THE ORANGE RIVER OF HIS MISSION TO
DAMARALAND AND GREAT NAMAQUALAND IN 1876, at 3 (1969). Palgrave noted in his report
that, "[i]n a short time it would enable us to control nearly the whole of the interior
trade." Id. at 88.
24. See G. COCERAM, SOUTH WEsT AFRICAN MANDATE 8 (1976) (discussing attempts of
Cape Colonists to induce British to annex Namibia, resulting in annexation of Walvis
Bay).
25. In 1883, Herr Adolf Luderitz requested protection from the German government
for a factory he planned to open at the Bay of Angra Pequena. Although Britain in-
dicated that it would consider the intrusion of another foreign power in the country as
an infringement of Her Majesty's legitimate right, Germany, in April of 1884, extended
protection to Angra Pcquena, later Luderitz Bay. See E. RITCHIE, supra note 6, at 87. The
Cape attempted to annex the entire coast in July of that year but these attempts came
too late to halt German advances. HousE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
353-56 (1884). Germany laid claim to all of the South West Africa territory but the Bay.
The division of the Bay from the rest of the territory was confirmed by the Berlin Con-
ference of November 1884 to February 1885. The major colonial powers gathered there to
resolve their differences on the partitioning of the African continent. See S. CROWE, THE
BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE 1884-1885, at 57-60, 191 (1942).
26. Another example of the Cape Colony's persistent efforts to acquire all Namibia-
Bay and hinterland-is the fact that it took the Cape six years to formally annex Walvis
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tegrate Walvis Bay with their colony;27 they believed that Germany
could not make a viable colony of Namibia without the Bay and pre-
ferred to wait until they could acquire control over all Namibia before
merging both with the mother colony.28
South Africa's attitudes toward the mandate system also help to
explain its actions in merging Walvis Bay into Namibia. The man-
date system did not permit annexation; it allowed administering powers
to govern the territories only until the residents of each territory were
able to govern themselves. 29 South Africa, however, viewed its man-
date for Namibia as a prelude to annexation.30 It believed that the
mandate's explicit provision against annexation would not be en-
forced 3' and thus felt that it could annex the mandated territory,
Namibia, and ignore any territorial disputes over Walvis Bay. Indeed,
after World War II, when the other mandatory powers placed their
mandated territories under United Nations Trust agreements, South
Africa petitioned the United Nations for permission to annex
Namibia.3 2 When the United Nations refused, South Africa attempted
to ignore its authority, an act in contravention of international law.33
Bay after the British gave her authority to do so. During that six year period the
evidence suggests that the Cape expended a great deal of energy attempting to persuade
Germany to agree either not to take the rest of the coastline or to concede the Cape's
rights to all the hinterland. HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 216 (1890).
27. Walvis Bay remained a sleepy colonial outpost until after World War I. See L.
GREEN, ON WINGS OF FIRE 38 (1967). The 1891 Cape Colony census revealed a European
population of 31 among 700 indigenous people. See RESULTS OF A CENSUS OF THE COLONY
OF THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE AS ON THE NIGHT OF SUNDAY, THE 5TH APRIL, 1891, at 50,
64 (1892). The European population remained at 32 in both the 1904 and 1911 censuses.
See RESULTS OF A CENSUS OF THE COLONY OF THE CAPE OF Goon HOPE AS ON THE NIGHT OF
SUNDAY, THE 17TH APRIL, 1904, at xxvi, li, 60-61 (1905); CENSUS OF THE UNION OF SOUTH
ArICA, 1911, at clxx (1913).
28. See HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 230 (1890).
29. See N. BENTWICH, THE MANDATES SYSTEF 3-4 (1930) (stating that mandate system
marked reaction against policy of acquisitiveness of Great Powers by precluding annexa-
tion); cf. H. GRIMAL, DECOLONIZATION OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, DUTCH AND BELGIAN EMPIRES
1919-1963, at 13-18 (1978) (mandate system broke from old notion of "timeless domination"
and moved to evolutionary arrangement which would come to end either by achievement
of independence or by voluntary integration with mother country).
30. See J. DUGARD, supra note 2, at 75-82 (discussing problem of determining who had
sovereignty under mandate system and noting that South Africa thought mandate "was
simply a pretext for annexation").
31. Id. at 119-27 (South African discussions of incorporation of Namibia, ignoring
U.N. authority).
32. Id. at 98-111 (explaining that South Africa wanted to annex Namibia in 1946
rather than turn South West Africa mandate into trusteeship agreement).
33. South Africa refused to transform its mandate into a trusteeship agreement, id.
at 112, and soon stopped sending the required annual reports to the U.N. Trusteeship
Council, id. at 119. This action led the International Court of Justice to issue an advisory
opinion reaffirming South Africa's obligation to report to the U.N., Advisory Opinion on
the International Status of South West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128. However, South Africa
continued to ignore the authority of the U.N. In 1965, the General Assembly terminated
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For all of these reasons, South Africa did not believe that, in merging
Walvis Bay with Namibia, it was jeopardizing its rights to the Bay;
the merger was but an intermediate step before the formal annexation
of Namibia. However, mistaken beliefs cannot excuse South Africa
from responsibility for the consequences of its actions. South Africa,
aware of its right to incorporate Walvis Bay into itself, chose not to
assert its rights effectively, but rather incorporated the Bay into Nami-
bia. It does not matter that mistaken beliefs existed; the first element
of international estoppel law is satisfied by this ineffective assertion.
Similarly, the second element is satisfied because South Africa should
have seen that its affirmative acknowledgments-by word and action-
of the unification of the Bay and the territory were reasonably relied
on by the residents of the Bay and Namibia as authoritative indications
that the unification was permanent. The standard of international law
is not proof of actual knowledge but proof that the facts were so
notorious that the country should have expected that others would
view the right as abandoned 3 4 Its statements and actions were pro-
claimed to the world community before the League of Nations. More-
over, its actions were more obvious to Namibia and Walvis Bay
residents than inconspicuous claims to the contrary in official reports;35
it is not reasonable to expect the residents to take such statements
seriously while ignoring the objective reality in their country.
Because these claims did indeed fail to dissuade the residents of the
Bay and the territory from the belief that the Bay would continue
as part of Namibia,3" residents of both areas have relied on this unifica-
the South African mandate over South West Africa, rendering illegal South Africa's con-
tinued occupation of the territory. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 2, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966). South Africa's refusal to heed the General Assembly prompted the
Security Council to issue a series of denunciatory resolutions. See Shockley, Enforcement
in United States Courts of the United Nations Council on Namibia's Decree on Natural
Resources, 2 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 285, 294 nA9 (1976) (listing resolutions). In 1971,
the International Court of Justice confirmed the General Assembly's legal authority over
Namibia and held that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal, Advisory Opinion
on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J.
16. South Africa continues to occupy Namibia. See, e.g., Assembly Calls on Council for
Action Against South Africa, 16 U.N. CHRONICLE no. 5, at 15 (July 1979).
34. See Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 116, 138-39 (imputing
knowledge of facts on basis of notoriety).
35. See, e.g., BUREAU OF STATISTICS, REPUBLIC OF SouTH AFRICA, POP'ULATION CENSUS, 6TH
SEPTEMBER, 1960, at vi (1963) (stating in introductory notes and in small print, "Walvis
Bay is an integral part of the Republic of South Africa. As it is geographically detached
from South Africa and administered from Windhoek as if it were part of South West
Africa, the figures for Walvis Bay are included for purposes of expediency in the figures
for South West Africa"; there is no further mention of Walvis Bay).
36. See, e.g., SOUTH WEST AFRICA BUSINEss DIRECTORY 1974, at 3 (1974) (including ad-
vertisement placed by Town Clerk of Walvis Bay stating in large type "Walvis Bay:
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tion in various segments of their lives; all aspects of the political,
economic, and educational systems of Walvis Bay and Namibia are
interdependent. 37 Separating the Bay and Namibia after so many years
of private reliance would result in serious dislocation.38 Because this
integration has occurred in reliance on South Africa's continual failure
to assert effectively its right to incorporate Walvis Bay, it is estopped
from suddenly changing that conduct by asserting claims to the Bay.
II. Precolonial Sovereignty and Modem Independence
The precolonial social and political integration of Walvis Bay and
Namibia also support the legal recognition of the modem unity of the
Bay and Namibia. Before the area was colonized, the Bay was part of the
sovereign area of the Nama people.3 9 Although Namibia clearly en-
compasses all the rest of the Nama lands, South Africa seeks to prevent
inclusion of Walvis Bay in the new nation. The Bay should be ac-
corded its right of self-determination as an integral part of Namibia.
A. The Doctrine of Legal Ties
International law gives authority over non-self-governing (NSG)
territories to the General Assembly of the United Nations and as-
signs to it the duty of facilitating the independence of such terri-
tories.40 As a preliminary step, the Assembly must determine which
regions within or combinations of NSG territories constitute "peoples"
entitled to recognition as national units.41 The Assembly has several
options in drawing the boundaries. Traditionally, colonially defined
boundaries were employed,42 but these often ignored the social and
Pivotal Point of South West Africa's Major Expansion Programme"); Windhoek Adver-
tiser, Apr. 26, 1976 (statement by South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster, who, in claiming
South African sovereignty over the Bay, admitted: "There are people in South West Africa
and elsewhere who are of the opinion that Walvis Bay belongs to South Vest Africa.")
(on file with Yale Law Journal).
37. See pp. 906-07 supra.
38. See Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 6A LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICA-
TIONS (14th Sess.) 69 (1928) (remarks of South African representative) (Walvis Bay essential
to economic development of mandated territory, for it was its best port; trade of South-
West Africa would be seriously injured without Walvis Bay); pp. 919-20 infra (discussion
of ways in which Namibia and Walvis Bay are currently dependent upon each other).
39. See note 76 infra (describing bounds of Great Namaqualand).
40. U.N. CHARTER arts. 73, 76, 85. The assembly may perform this duty in a number of
ways, including by holding free elections in the territory. See Western Sahara (Advisory
Opinion), [1 9 75] I.C.J. 12, 29-37 (discussing several methods of implementing self-de-
termination).
41. Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, 33.
42. See, e.g., H. GRIMAL, supra note 29, at 295-305 (describing creation of Ghana and
Nigeria; colonial boundaries employed).
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political organization of the indigenous peoples.43 This indifference to
local populations often roused historic frictions after a country gained
independence; violent skirmishes and even civil wars resulted.44
The discord fostered by this adherence to colonially defined borders
has caused the Assembly, in facilitating the independence of NSG
territories, to consider the social and political organization that existed
in the territory prior to colonization. The General Assembly passed
Resolution 1514 in order to provide the authority for such an inquiry
into the historical organization, which is labeled "legal ties." 45 The
analysis of legal ties considers both the existence of past social and
political organizations and the patterns of allegiance within these
organizations. 40
The legal ties necessary to establish the sovereign rights of an in-
digenous people were recently clarified by the International Court of
Justice in the Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) decision. 47 In analyz-
ing a decolonization situation, the court affirmed the sovereign rights
of a "people" to the territory they inhabit if, at the "critical date," they
maintained a sufficiently developed social and political organization.48
In determining the legal ties between Namibia and Walvis Bay, the
43. Id. at 45.
44. Nigeria was created by British colonists from several previously independent
kingdoms. M. CROWDER, THE STORY OF NIGERIA 11 (1978). This ethnic diversity was largely
responsible for the bitter 1967-70 civil war. Id. at 259-77.
45. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960); see
Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, 40-41 ("legal ties" used in request
for advisory opinion as term of art to describe historical organizations).
46. See Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, 41-68 (examining evidence
of legal ties). The opinion noted that legal ties may exist that do not amount to ties of
sovereignty. Id. at 64.
47. Id. The Western Sahara is a region on the west coast of Africa that had been
colonized and administered by Spain. When Spain withdrew, both Morocco and Mauritania
claimed historic rights of sovereignty over the territory. The Court rejected these claims.
Id. at 42-57 (Moroccan claim), 57-65 (Mauritanian claim). Spain opposed the claims by
arguing that because the Western Sahara had been separate and legally distinct from
both Morocco and Mauritania at the time of colonization, its modern independence should
be recognized. Id. at 61. The Court's rejection of the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims
implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of the Spanish argument.
48. The organization need not match the structure of the classical European state. Id.
at 39. The decision rejects the views of nineteenth century writers who maintained that
sovereignty appertained only to "civilized" peoples. The English writers were especially
fond of these views. For example, Westlake linked his definition of sovereignty to that of
his definition of civilization: there is no sovereignty "where [Europeans] find no native
government capable of controlling white men or under which white civilization can exist."
J. WEsmLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
145 (1914). In rejecting these views, the Court returned to the position of precolonial
writers that "whenever a country is inhabited by people who are connected by some
political organization . . . such country is not to be regarded as territorium nullius and
open to acquisition by Occupation." M. LINDLEY, suPra note 7, at 17.
The Yale Law Journal
critical date at which past organizations are to be examined must first
be established. 49
Critical date analysis is applied in two distinct situations. In what
may be termed the noncolonial situation, two existing powers both
assert sovereignty over an area of land that has no indigenous popula-
tion.50 In such cases, the claims are examined as of the date at which the
second claimant attempts to exercise sovereignty.51 In a post-colonial
situation, however, the General Assembly seeks to return sovereign
rights to the inhabitants of the territory; it applies critical date analysis
to different contestants and for different ends.52 Unlike the non-
colonial situation, the analysis in a post-colonial dispute concerns the
residents of an NSG territory. Determination of the critical date is
made solely to help the General Assembly create strong cohesive na-
tions by clarifying prior legal ties. 53 Thus the date that most clearly
exemplifies the prior social and political organization of the territory
best fulfills the purpose of determining the critical date in post-colonial
situations.54 The date need not be the official time of colonization.
The Walvis Bay/Namibia dispute is of the post-colonial type. Be-
fore the advent of colonialism in southern Africa, both the southern
half of Namibia and Walvis Bay were populated by the Nama. The
area was thus not terra nullius.55 Although the critical date under the
noncolonial analysis would be 1884, the year in which both England
49. Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, 38.
50. See, e.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos, Judgment, [1953] I.C.J. 47; Legal Status of Eastern
Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J. Series A/B, No. 53, at 22; Island of Palmas (United States v.
Netherlands), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).
51. The issue is resolved by determining whether the first claimant had previously
established sovereignty over the area by effectively occupying it. If it had, the second
claimant is defeated. If there had been no prior effective occupation, the territory was
terra nullius at the critical date and the second power's claim of sovereignty is recognized.
See, e.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, at 44
(critical date that at which Norway asserted sovereignty); Island of Palmas (United States
v. The Netherlands), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928) (critical date terminology).
52. See Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, 38 ("[the Court] is not
-.. concerned to establish a 'critical date' in the sense given to this term in territorial
disputes; for the questions do not ask the Court to adjudicate between conflicting [claims]";
court set critical date solely to locate controversy in correct historical context).
53. See id. at 37 (goal of opinion to aid General Assembly decision on independence of
Western Sahara).
54. This purpose is reflected in the choice of a critical date in the Western Sahara
opinion. The language of the court suggests that the critical date may be set at the
beginning of a series of continuous acts that culminate in colonization, rather than at the
exact date of colonization. See id. at 38 (considering Spanish acts antecedent to coloniza-
tion).
55. See id. at 39 (applying terra nullius analysis to post-colonial situation; terra nullius
is a territory belonging to no one). In Walvis Bay, the Topnaar, a tribe of the Nama, had
an established settlement for over a century prior to the coming of Europeans. See B.
TINDALL, THE JOURNAL OF JOSEPH TINDALL 40 (1959).
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and Germany finally asserted colonial claims,56 a better date for ex-
amining past legal ties is 1810, the date at which the political and
social organization of the indigenous population was most clear. After
1810, the existing legal ties were disrupted by the European settlement
of the Cape of Good Hope, which forced a wave of migration of the
indigenous South African people, the Orlams, northward into present
day Namibia.57 Thus, the political and social organizations that
existed in 1884 do not accurately reflect the precolonial ties of the
indigenous population of Namibia.58 The year 1810, therefore, is the
most appropriate critical date.
Having established the appropriate date, it is necessary to evaluate
the legal ties at that time. The analysis of legal ties proceeds along two
dimensions: 1) were the existing organizations sufficiently developed
to possess sovereignty; 2) did the patterns of ultimate allegiance within
these organizations unify the areas under consideration?0 The Western
Sahara decision does not specify the threshold of adequate legal ties.
Presumably, the threshold of adequate legal ties that the International
Court of Justice would recognize as indicative of a sovereign organiza-
tion would not need to reach the threshold of the classical European
state.60 On the other hand, the Court would not want the mere pre-
sence of random inhabitants at the critical date to constitute sufficient
legal ties. 61 Between these clear cases, however, a case-by-case ap-
proach, according to the type of evidence specified in the Western
Sahara case, is necessary to evaluate the diverse ways that peoples
organize themselves.
B. The Indigenous Culture of Namibia
The Western Sahara opinion indicates the type of evidence that is
relevant to the inquiry into legal ties: 1) recognition by foreign
powers; 2) a sophisticated, uniform political organization; 3) a uniform
56. See notes 5 & 25 supra.
57. See H. VEDDER, SOUTH WEsr AFRICA IN EARLY TIMEs 223, 365 (1938) (history of
migrations); Hoernle, The Social Organization of the Nama Hottentots of Southwest
Africa, 27 Am. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1, 4 (1925) (describing impact of migrations on traditional
Nama culture). Although the Orlams were originally closely related to the Nama in-
habitants, they were greatly influenced by the early Dutch settlers of the Cape Colony
and thus were culturally and politically distinct from the Nama by the time of migration.
Id.
58. See H. VEDER, supra note 57, at 364-65 (history of nineteenth century Namibia).
59. This analysis is implicit in the reasoning of the LC.J. in the Western Sahara
opinion. See Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, 47-62.
60. See note 48 supra (Western Sahara opinion rejects narrow view of sovereign rights).
61. The Court's use of the terra nullius test exemplifies such a minimum threshold
test. See note 55 supra.
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cultural identity; and 4) geographical contiguity.62 An analysis of the
available evidence on Namibia and Walvis Bay in 1810 demonstrates
a sophisticated and unified indigenous culture. These legal ties are
sufficient to warrant the General Assembly's affirmance of the modern
unification of the areas.
The existence and distinctiveness of "Great Namaqualand," as the
Nama area, which included Walvis Bay, was known, was recognized by
early European explorers.0 3 The autonomy of this area was confirmed
by later writers. 34 In addition, contemporary foreign sovereign authori-
ties accorded recognition to the area.0 5 Therefore, to outsiders, Great
Namaqualand possessed a significant degree of sovereignty.
Internally, the Nama possessed a sophisticated political organiza-
tion. Within Great Namaqualand, they were historically divided into
seven tribes. The vast land area and nomadic way of life did not
promote centralization of authority among the tribes; rather, they
formed a functional confederation. 0 The Red Nation was historically
the senior and paramount tribe.0 The Topnaar Nama occupied the
region that included Walvis Bay.""
The political organization of the Nama was uniform throughout
Namaqualand. Each tribe had a chief and tribal council. The chief
presided over the council and, in times of war, commanded the army
and negotiated peace.0 9 In peacetime, the council, run by majority
decision, was the ultimate authority within the tribe. 0 The Topnaar
62. See Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, at 148-64 (listing factual
considerations of majority in Separate Opinion of Judge DeCastro).
63. See, e.g., I J. ALEXANDER, ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION INTO AFRICA 113 (London 1838)
(early explorer's account of meetings with Topnaars and other Nama); W. PALGRAVE,
supra note 23, at 5.
64. See, e.g., 0. LEVINSON, SOUTH VFST AFRICA 7 (1976) (modern history of Namibia);
Hoernle, supra note 57, at 2 (anthropologist's study of Nama culture in the early 1900's).
65. For example, the Orlam tribes negotiated with the Nama for the use of Nama
land and water. AV. PALCRAVE, supra note 23, at 17; Hoernle, supra note 57, at 4. Similarly,
the Germans implicitly recognized the Nama by seeking sovereignty in the areas they
colonized through treaties of protection and cession rather than by outright occupation. M.
LINDLEY, supra note 7, at 38-39, 184-85.
66. There was no pressure to organize the tribes, due to the excess land area and the
nomadic way of life. I. SCHAPERA, THE KHOISAN PEOPLES OF SouTH AFRICA 346 (1930); H.
VEDDER, suPra note 57, at 364-65; Hoernle, supra note 57, at 3, 6.
67. H. VEDDER, supra note 57, at 126-28, 364-65. The chief of the Red Nation demanded
"a small yearly tax . . . in sheep and cattle . . . in recognition of his suzerainty." Id. at
127. All of the tribes recognized their common ancestry and were friendly with the other
tribes. 2 J. ALEXANDER, supra note 63, at 109.
68. See W. PALGRAVE, supra note 23, at 94 (listing tribes in 1876); Hoernle, supra note
57, at 5 (listing original tribes).
69. I. SCHAPERA, supra note 66, at 328.
70. Each member of the council was the head of a sib, a family group related in the
male line. Hoernle, supra note 57, at 9. The sib was the strongest unit of Nama organiza-
tion, id. at 15, and formed the basis of a complex system of social organization and
propriety, id. at 16-23.
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Nama were ruled in the customary fashion until their political or-
ganization was destroyed by the colonial process. 71 Topnaars continue
to live in the area of Walvis Bay.72
The Nama of Great Namaqualand also formed a culturally distinct
entity. They possessed a uniform and rigid social code.7 3 They all
spoke a dialect of the Khoisan language 74  and shared a common
religion. 75
Geographically, the Topnaar region, of which Walvis Bay was a
part, formed the northwest corner of Great Namaqualand. Great
Namaqualand was a large rectangular region covering the southern
and central portions of modern Namibia.7 6 The Topnaar region was
thus contiguous with the rest of the Nama lands. Moreover, it was
located at the lower ends of the Swakop and Kuisip rivers, both of
which drained large portions of Great Namaqualand and served as pre-
colonial highways between the Bay and the rest of the Nama region.77
Therefore, Walvis Bay was an integral and undifferentiated part of
Great Namaqualand. This unification was corroborated by contem-
poraneous political maps,78 an element accorded great significance in
the Western Sahara opinion.7
9
By all the elements of the Western Sahara "legal ties" test, the Nama
71. Alexander, in 1837, described the Topnaars as "a large tribe of red men, speaking
the Namaqua language, and who inhabit the shores about NValvisch Bay." 2 J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 63, at 72, 100. The Topnaars fished, harvested a desert melon called 'naras,
and kept large herds of cattle and sheep. In 1854, Andersson found the remaining
Topnaars subsisting on fish and 'naras; their herds had been destroyed and their numbers
reduced by the wars caused by the influx of the Orlams. J. WALLIS, FORTUNE MY FOE
47-48 (1936); accord, W. PALGRAVE, supra note 23, at 6.
72. 0. LEVINSON, supra note 64, at 4.
73. See Hoernle, supra note 57, at 9 (anthropologist's study of Nama culture).
74. T. HAHN, TsUNI-//COAIa 3, 5 (1881).
75. This religion was based on the deity Tsuni-//goam. See id. at 30-52; H. VEnDER,
supra note 57, at 58-60.
76. Great Namaqualand was bounded by the Atlantic Ocean, the Orange River, the
Kalahari, and an unoccupied area on the north that ran across the width of modern
Namibia at the latitude of the present capital of Windhoek (then nonexistent). See H.
VEDDER, supra note 57, at 51, 365.
77. See 2 J. ALEXANDER, supra note 63, at 106-10 (explorer used riverbeds for travel);
H. VEDDER, supra note 57, at 38 (describing riverbeds as "highways").
78. See, e.g., I J. ALEXANDER, supra note 63, at 1 (map reflecting early confusion of
some tribal names); B. TINDALL, supra note 55, at 194 (map for period 1839-55); H. VEDDER,
supra note 57, at 166 (map of Great Namaqualand area, circa 1820); id. at 242 (map for
period 1820-1880); J. WHTE, THE LAxD GOD MADE IN ANGER 64 (1969) (showing Topnaar
area around Walvis Bay as part of Great Namaqualand in 1880). Maps of this area prior
to the colonial period are scarce.
79. Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, 152. The use of maps as
evidence is unusual in international law. International decisionmakers usually are hesitant
to give great evidentiary value to maps in determining international boundaries. See
Weissberg, Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes, 57 AMs. J. INT'L L.
781, 781 (1963).
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possessed sovereign rights over the whole of Great Namaqualand, of
which Walvis Bay was an integral part.80 Modern Namibia is the
successor to these rights. Therefore, the General Assembly should give
effect to the Namibian claims by including Walvis Bay in the new
nation at the time it achieves self-determination.
III. General Assembly Authority Over Walvis Bay
The two preceding legal arguments establish that Namibian claims
to sovereignty over Walvis Bay are stronger than any claims South
Africa asserts. Yet even if Namibia did not have such strong claims to
the Bay, South Africa would still be unable to claim authority over
the Bay because of Walvis Bay's status as a non-self-governing territory.
Because Walvis Bay qualifies as an NSG territory, the United Nations
Charter imposes responsibilities on South Africa toward the inhabitants
of the Bay. Because South Africa has abdicated those responsibilities,
it has lost legitimate authority over the Bay.
A. Walvis Bay as a Non-Self-Governing Territory
Walvis Bay is not an integral part of South Africa, but a non-self-
governing territory. Two United Nations General Assembly resolu-
tionss ' establish the three criteria for determining whether a territory
is non-self-governing: 1) the territory must be geographically separate
from the administering state; 2) its people must be ethnically or cul-
turally distinct from those of the administering state; and 3) its status
must be arbitrarily subordinate to that of the administering state.8 2
Applying these three criteria to the objective status of Walvis Bay
80. The relationship of Walvis Bay to Namibia is not analogous to that of the Western
Sahara and Mauritania. Mauritania was formed from several nonhomogeneous and pre-
viously independent entities; the Western Sahara was an independent entity at the critical
date and was never a part of Mauritania. Mauritania thus did not have historic legal ties
that would justify the General Assembly's unification of the Western Sahara with
Mauritania. See Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), [1975] I.C.J. 12, 59.
Namibia was also created by colonial joinder of several previously independent and
nonhomogeneous entities. Unlike the Western Sahara, however, Walvis Bay was not a
separate entity at the critical date but a part of one of the entities, Great Namaqualand,
that was joined to form Namibia. Namibia thus seeks only to reincorporate a historical
part of one of its constituent entities, not to incorporate a previously unrelated entity.
81. G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960); G.A.
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
82. G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Resolu-
tion 1514 declares that "subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and
exploitation" is a denial of human rights and a violation of the U.N. Charter, and that
all peoples have the right to determine freely their own political, economic, social and
cultural development. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, Stpp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960). "Arbitrarily subordinate" describes the predicament of peoples who are subject to
alien control and denied the right of self-determination as defined by Resolution 1514.
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over a number of relevant time periods establishes that Walvis Bay is
a non-self-governing territory.
Between 1878 and 1922, Walvis Bay was successively an NSG ter-
ritory of the United Kingdom, the Cape Colony, and South Africa.
Walvis Bay was geographically separate and ethnically and culturally
distinct from each. 3 Walvis Bay was also arbitrarily subordinate; South
Africa never accorded the Bay the treatment or status of an integral part
of itself.8 4 Furthermore, because Walvis Bay was under South African
control, as South Africa argues and admits,83 its residents could not
have exercised their right of self-determination.
Moreover, even if Walvis Bay were not an NSG territory of South
Africa before 1922, it became one after that year. In 1922, South
Africa enacted the South West Africa Administration Act, which
joined Walvis Bay for administrative purposes with the mandated
territory of South West Africa."0 Walvis Bay was still geographically
83. It could be argued that Walvis Bay, at present, is not ethnically and culturally
distinct from South Africa. The residents in both Walvis Bay and South Africa could be
viewed as multiracial groups and therefore similar. This Note, however, argues that the
ielevant ethnic and cultural group in South Africa is solely European while the relevant
group in Walvis Bay is multiracial but predominantly African.
In 1884, when Walvis Bay was an NSG territory of first the United Kingdom and then of
the Cape Colony, the Bay, the U.K., and the Cape were culturally and ethnically distinct:
the Bay was all African; the U.K. and the Cape were all European. In recent times, how-
ever, colonialism in Walvis Bay has resulted in a multiracial population. South Africa
also describes her residents as multiracial.
Although South Africa has a multiracial residential population, her African residents
have no political rights. See A. VANDENBOSCH, supra note 22, at 24-28. Moreover, her
apartheid policies do not allow Africans in South Africa to be citizens of South Africa
but rather citizens of a number of so-called "tribal homelands" or "bantustans." Id. If
Africans have no say in the South African government and, in fact, are not even con-
sidered citizens of South Africa, they should not be counted as part of the relevant ethnic
or cultural group used in the analysis described in Resolution 1541, G.A. Res. 1541, 15
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Only the European population
in South Africa should be recognized.
In contrast to a European population, Walvis Bay has a multiracial population. This
population is predominantly African. Thus the population of Walvis Bay is distinct
ethnically and culturally from the European group in South Africa.
84. Except for the existence of some trade and the presence of a limited military force,
South Africa never integrated Walvis Bay into herself. See HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES,
CAPE OF GooD HOPE (1884-1904) (debates on Walvis Bay focused on use of Bay as trading
post without mentioning internal development); note 27 supra (showing that South Africa
did not develop or integrate the Bay). For example, no voting rights were accorded the
residents of Walvis Bay equal to the voting rights of other South African citizens. See
HousE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 280 (1899) (bill to extend voting rights
to inhabitants of Walvis Bay dismissed); Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes, 6
LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS (15th Sess.) 75 (1929) (South African representative admits
Walvis Bay not included in electoral laws of South Africa or Cape Colony).
85. See note 5 supra.
86. See South West Africa Affairs Act No. 24 of 1922, THE LAws OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA
1915-1922, at 20 (1923) (Walvis Bay, which forms part of province of Cape of Good Hope,
shall be administered as if part of mandated territory).
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separate and ethnically and culturally distinct from the Union, thus
satisfying the first two criteria of the General Assembly test. As for the
third criterion, even if the Bay had enjoyed equal status with the rest
of the Union, as the South African argument that the Bay has always
been an integral part of South Africa would imply, it was unequivocally
subordinated to the Union when it was joined with the mandated
territory, which by definition was already subordinate to and ruled by
the Union.8 7
The status of Walvis Bay as an NSG territory has continued through
the present. The status and rights of residents of the Bay, although
improved since 1922, remain arbitrarily subordinate to those of the
residents of South Africa. Although Walvis Bay is allegedly part of the
Cape Province, residents of the Bay have no input into the affairs of
the Province; all their political power is exercised through the man-
dated territory.88 The status of South West Africa as a mandated
territory, and of its residents as citizens of a mandated territory, are
recognized by the world community and admitted by South Africa to
be subordinate. Therefore, because, under the 1922 Administration
Act, the rights of Bay residents are identical to those of residents of the
territory, the rights of the Bay residents are subordinate to those of
the citizens of South Africa.
B. The Violation of Duties Under the United Nations Charter
Article 73 of the United Nations Charter states that a nation ad-
ministering an NSG territory has certain responsibilities to the in-
digenous peoples of the administered territory that are described as
its "sacred trust."8 9 The administering nation must not violate this
trust if it expects to retain control over the territory. By installing
apartheid in Walvis Bay, South Africa has violated its obligation to
87. See N. BENTWICH, suora note 29, at 3-5 (describing mandate system and showing that
mandated territories are subordinate to their administering authorities); H. GRIMAL, supra
note 29, at 13-18 (same).
88. The subordinate status of the mandated territory has continued to the present.
See E. ROBERTSON, SuBjEcT LIST AND INDEX OF THE LAWS OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA FRO7. 1915
TO 1969, at 2-4 (1973) (noting that Namibia has alwa)s been subordinate to South Africa).
89. Article 73 establishes the following general obligations owed by an administering
sovereign to a non-self-governing territory:
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the ad-
ministration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to
the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the
present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories ....
U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
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the people to administer the Bay as a sacred trust. Thus administrative
authority should revert to the General Assembly.
Article 73 represents a radical concept; it allows the United Nations
to take an NSG away from an irresponsible administrative authority.90
Responsibility for developing conditions for self-determination by the
indigenous population of an NSG territory is assumed by the ad-
ministering authority along with the objective act of adminstration.01
The South West Africa Case of 1971 confirmed that Article 73 not only
applies to trust or mandate territories, but also "clearly embraces ter-
ritories under a colonial regime."0 2 The sacred trust that Article 73
obliges all administering authorities to assume includes the duties to
respect the cultures of residents of an NSG territory, promote their
overall advancement, ensure them just treatment,93  develop their
powers of self-government,94  and further international peace and
security.95
South Africa, in administering Walvis Bay, has instituted the racial
policy of apartheid.00 Apartheid violates the purposes and principles
of the United Nations Charter and the sacred trust prescribed in
Article 73.97 Thus, South Africa has failed to fulfill the obligations that
it owes to Walvis Bay. South Africa has already forfeited its rights of ad-
ministration over Namibia as a result of violations of the sacred trust
imposed by the mandate.98 Because South Africa has also violated the
90. See Reisman, The Case of Western Somaliland, 1 HoRN oF AFR., no. 3, at 13, 20
(July-Sept. 1978).
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
92. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 32.
93. The obligations created by Article 73 include: "to ensure, with due respect for
the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational ad-
vancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses; . . ." U.N. CHARTER
art. 73, para. a.
94. The relevant part of Article 73 reads as follows: "to develop self-government, to
take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the
progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
." Id. para. b.
95. Id. para. c.
96. See A. VANDENBOSCH, suPra note 22, at 219 (1970) (describing apartheid in all of
Namibia); Cf. J. SERFONTEIN, supra note 15, at 422 (describing segregated housing in
Walvis Bay).
97. See Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 56-57 (apartheid "a flagrant violation of
the purposes and principles of the [U.N.] Charter").
98. Id.; see Reisman, supra note 90, at 18-20.
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sacred trust in controlling Walvis Bay, it has forfeited its rights of
administration over the Bay as well. 99
Therefore the General Assembly has the authority to administer the
Bay subject to the duties of Article 73. Accordingly, the General As-
sembly must administer the territory by respecting the will of the
people and their rights to self-determination. 10 0 The Assembly already
has decided, however, that the self-determination of the people of
Walvis Bay lies in recognizing its integration with Namibia. 1° 1 Such a
decision is within the legal authority of the Assembly, subject only to
the objections of the people of Walvis Bay. 102
IV. The Creation of a Viable Namibia
In addition to the international legal norms already examined, the
General Assembly should be concerned with the viability of any new
entity it creates. It should not create a state whose chance for survival
and independence is significantly impaired.
The creation of the Polish Corridor after World War I is an
acknowledgment of the need for access to the sea as a condition of
viability.103 Namibia is not viable as a nation without Walvis Bay, its
best harbor. The inability to transport exports and imports to and
from world markets would force Namibia to be both politically and
economically dependent on South Africa. Namibia depends on the
export of products from its ranching, fishing, and mining industries. 10 4
With the proceeds of these exports, Namibia finances the import of
99. See Reisman, supra note 90, at 20.
100. Id. at 18-20.
101. See G.A. Res. 32/9D, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 16, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
102. Although evidence of the desires of Walvis Bay residents is scant, the statements
of the South West African Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) are indicative of these desires.
The United Nations has recognized SWAPO as the authentic representative of the
Namibian people. G.A. Res. 3111, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 93, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1974); R. GIBSON, AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 107-45 (1972) (recounting history of
SWAPO and other less popular liberation groups). SWAPO has stated that Walvis Bay is
an integral part of Namibia. OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE, June 1978 (Special Supp. No. 2).
103. The Powers at Versailles believed that Poland's access to the sea was economically
and politically necessary for its independence. See R. DONALD, THE POLISH CORRIDOR AND
THE CONSEQUENCES 9, 10, 20-21, 141-42 (1929). Poland was economically dependent on ex-
ports and, without the Corridor, would have been dependent on the good will of its
neighbors for access to trade. See A. ToMAS, THE "POLISH CORRIDOR" AND PEACE 13-14
(1930). Colonial powers, assembled at the Conference of Berlin in 1885, confirmed the
importance of access to trade in creating viable countries. See S. CROWE, supra note 25, at
167.
104. See ANNUAL ECONOMIC REVIEW OF SOUTH AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA 21-23 (1971)
(describing export based economy).
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most manufactured goods and food.10° The Namibian economy thus
depends for its survival on easy access to international trade.
Namibia's transportation alternatives are few. The airports are of
limited capacity,10 and transportation of large quantities of basic
commodities by air is generally uneconomical. Namibia has only two
natural harbors: Walvis Bay is large, sandy-bottomed, and easily ex-
pandable; Luderitz Bay is smaller and rocky, and expansion is econom-
ically infeasible. WAalvis Bay is clearly the more valuable of the two. 0 7
The only remaining access to international trade is over land. The
limited Namibian road and rail systems run through Windhoek, the
capital, to Walvis Bay on the west coast and to South Africa to the
south. Therefore, all feasible transportation alternatives include Walvis
Bay or South Africa. The creation of alternative trade routes would be
difficult; it would be nearly impossible for a newly independent de-
veloping nation to obtain the necessary capital, technology, and labor
to extend the road and railways over the Angolan border to Angolan
ports. 08 Similar problems can be expected to prevent Namibia from
building a separate port elsewhere on the coast. If Walvis Bay were
South African territory, South Africa would control all Namibian access
to international trade.
If Namibia were economically dependent on South Africa, political
dependence could easily result as well. Changes in regulations or even
border closings would be immediately useful political weapons. In
essence, South Africa would have an effective veto power over the
Namibian government. Moreover, the port of Walvis Bay is the only
one between Angola and South Africa capable of supporting a navy or
coast guard; it is thus vital to military control over Namibian terri-
torial waters.'00 Each of these factors would threaten the viability of
Namibia if Walvis Bay belonged to South Africa.1 0
105. See SOUTH WEST AFRICA HANDBOOK 1971-1972, at 35 (1971). Only 1.1%, of the land
can support normal crops. J. SERFONTEIN, supra note 15, at 9.
106. See Namib Times, Apr. 1, 1977 (on file with Yale Law Journal).
107. See SOUTH WEsr AFRICA HANDBOOK, supra note 105, at 36. In 1967, 94%" of all goods
entering Namibia by sea entered at Walvis Bay. Id.; 0. LEVINSON, supra note 64, at 107.
108. This situation is similar to Zambia's partially successful attempt to build her own
link to the sea. Zambia, another developing African nation and a landlocked country,
wished to have access to the sea other than its existing rail line through its unfriendly
neighbor Rhodesia. China offered free financing, technological assistance, and labor to
build the Tazara Railroad through Tanzania. Yet, this massive aid was not sufficient.
Zambia was forced to continue to rely on its Rhodesian rail link for continued economic
survival. THE ECONOansT, Apr. 7, 1979, at 80; TIME, Nov. 6, 1978, at 67.
109. South Africa presently uses the enclave as a means of controlling the shipping lanes
off the Namibian coast. As in other parts of Namibia, South Africa has constructed a
major military base at Walvis Bay. OBJECTIVE: JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 3.
110. The use of Walvis Bay as a free port under South African sovereignty has been
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The determination of international boundaries is an event of po-
tentially widespread consequence. When boundaries are arbitrary, they
become the source of international tension. To delineate international
boundaries properly, historically significant patterns of sovereignty,
the current de facto organization of the area, and the future prospects
of the new nation should be considered. The General Assembly must
determine whether to reinstate or to abolish permanently the bound-
ary between the non-self-governing territories of Walvis *Bay and
Namibia. The historical unity of the areas, their present functional
integration, and the prospects for future friction if the areas are
divided support only one resolution: the creation of a single viable
nation that unifies Namibia with Walvis Bay.
proposed. See Windhoek Advertiser, Apr. 9, (1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal);
Namib Times, Apr. 1, 1977 (on file with Yale Law Journal). South African sovereignty,
however, would give the South Africans great discretion to ignore the free port agree-
ments and put economic pressure on Namibia. The same trade advantages would exist if
the Bay was a Namibian free port, but South Africa would be forced to seize the port to
have the same political control; such an invasion is much less likely than an abrogation
of trade laws.
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